Not many years ago the Harvard economist Lant Pritchett called India a “flailing state” for its gigantic failures to implement programmes and policies crucial to maintain public trust in governance. According to Pritchett, “In police, tax collection, education, health, power, water supply—in nearly every routine service—there is rampant absenteeism, indifference, incompetence and corruption. In many parts of India, in many sectors, the everyday actions of the field-level agents of the state – policemen, engineers, teachers, health workers – are increasingly beyond the control of the administration at the national or state level.” Of course, Pritchett is not the lone authority to deride India’s appalling public service delivery. It has been equally derided by the government’s own committees and commissions (most recently by the second administrative reforms commission). Between 2008 (Pritchett’s paper) and 2012, state of service delivery has not changed much, but if Pritchett were to take a glance at some recent developments with respect to service delivery, he might revise his wording ‘flailing’ much sooner.

Led by Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Bihar, states once shackled with BIMARU stigma and quickly joined by another dozen of states, the Service Guarantee Act (SGA) is currently a major thrust to answer the long-standing service delivery woes that average citizens ascribe to official apathy and corruption. A fortuitous by-product of competitive democratic politics which is increasingly converging with good governance ideals (transparency, accountability, timely redressal of grievances, responsive and citizen-friendly administration), the SGA takes public governance, especially service delivery and grievance redressal functions, to a new level by recognising ‘access’ to basic services as a legally enforceable right. By expressly making access to public services a legal right, setting a time-frame for their availability, creating designated officers to oversee such functions with a system of penalty and fine for delay or denial of services, the SGA intends to overhaul service delivery functions. In short, the SGA appears to be the game changer for citizen-state relationship. 

The initial reports of implementation by a number of states, in fact, make one optimistic about their transformative potential. For instance, the MP law which imposes penalties between Rs 250 and Rs 5,000 on erring officials has got departments flooded with service demands. In a matter of two years, officials have received a mammoth 1.25 crore applications and complaints and nearly cent percent cases have been dispensed without second appeal. What is more important is that the MP law provides for compensation that is to be paid to the complainant out of the penalties imposed on the defaulting officers. Bihar which has put greater reliance on electronic mode of compliance is able to dispose complaints at a much faster rate notwithstanding many constraints. The Delhi Act equally relies on ICT tools and electronic delivery of services. Its robust online monitoring system (e-SLA) is able to capture the submission of service applications and their disposal electronically through a central server. As a result, the higher authorities are able to oversee the performance of their departments and are able to track any sort of delay in a hassle-free manner.

A pet initiative of Sukhbir Singh Badal, the Punjab law delivers services even faster.  For instance, documents such as sale and lease deed and partnership deed are provided on the same day, while birth/death certificates are provided in two working days.

The most heartening outcome of this fledging initiative is that it has triggered a healthy competition among the initiating states. For instance, to streamline implementation the government of Madhya Pradesh has created a new department of public services management with an independent minister to oversee the entire process. Further, taking some cues from Kerala’s Rajiv Gandhi Seva Kendra example, MP has set up 400 Lok Seva Kendras to be run through public-private partnership (PPP) mode. Whereas a resource-constrained Bihar is investing heavily on the electronic delivery mode (with an IT manager at each block and tehsil) to reach out its most excluded and marginalised populations. So far, the Bihar government has appointed 315 IT managers at block levels to oversee the online process. In an excellent example of leveraging ICT tools to deliver services, Delhi government has raised the bar for electronic mode of service delivery by putting up a robust electronic monitoring system to monitor 70 services. For instance, Delhi’s online monitoring system can capture the submission of service applications and their disposal electronically through a central software in which various departments data is integrated and linked to the central software, which can then be used to generate reports and evaluations that can assist higher authorities in monitoring the performance of their departments and track any sort of delay or denial. Some late entrants like J&K have gone to the extent of defining service deficiency and instituting strict penalties for the same. More importantly, states are demonstrating fair degree of seriousness by learning lessons quickly and making required changes to improve the process of implementation.

Notwithstanding early promises, these legislations would struggle to change the pathetic culture of public administration and make senior babus back the proposed change. In ideal circumstances, governments ought to have accomplished the same fit by effecting changes in the work culture within the bureaucracy and strengthening internal accountability mechanisms to ensure appointed officials fulfil their basic obligations to citizens rather than resorting to ‘legalistic’ solutions. Simple executive action would have been enough to ensure the bureaucracy does its primary jobs. However, considering the pathetic state of public administration that exists in most of Indian states and continued resistance and apathy among the officials, particularly senior functionaries, to reforms (comprehensively reflected in the second administrative reforms commission report 2008), this has to be imposed, albeit via legal routes. In short, extraordinary situation demands extraordinary measures.

Further, despite many enabling provisions and legal sanctions around them, these legal charters (legislations) have to go a long way to become perfect documents. For instance, there are glaring anomalies with regard to their scope, implementation frameworks, penalty, timeline for disposal of complaints and issues of quality and scale of services. Most notably, the scope of SGAs is restricted to delivery of essential documents (certificates, licences) and cash (pensions, stipends) and services in kind (electricity, water connections). It does not include issues of human development such as nutrition, food, health, education, etc. Further, SGAs barely address the issues of quality and adequacy of services. Importantly, even the legal status of the Act does not guarantee that it would be honoured in letter and spirit. For proof, see the ‘unenviable’  record of implementation with regard to several rights-based legislations such as the Forest Rights Act 2006,  Right to Education 2009, Employment Guarantee Scheme (Maharashtra) and Child Labour (abolition and rehabilitation), 2006. Key provisions of many of these path-breaking legislations have been implemented in their breaches.

Despite these anomalies and many daunting challenges with regard to implementation, there is every reason to feel optimistic about the long-term effects of these Acts. The reason is simple. Unlike many rights-based legislations (which largely emerged through civil society pressures and enacted by the centre and imposed on the states), the SGAs are purely state-led initiatives with considerable political capital being invested for their success. For instance, a growing number of chief ministers are adopting SGA as their pet projects for its vote bank potentials. Some of them have gone to the great length of personally overseeing its implementation. More importantly, service delivery no longer being the “holy cow” of rents and official corruption (areas like natural resources, spectrum, land/real estate have emerged as most lucrative sources of rents), politicians see this “dispensable” sector. In the long run though, the penalty provision will be the real game changer. In fact, the relative success of the Right to Information Act has a lot to do with penalty provision, apart from the public rebuking of officials by media and civil society.

Given the kind of traction that the service guarantee legislations have taken in such quick time, the least that the centre can do is to help consolidate the fledging reform process by quickly enacting two important bills pending for quite some time. While the Grievance Redress Bill (the Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011) can provide an overarching legal and institutional framework to many vexing issues and exert much needed pressure on states living in the “waiting zone”, the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 can greatly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. The twin bills are the most non-threatening and least controversial bills that can easily receive bipartisan support in the parliament for their passage. In short, service guarantee legislation offers a great opportunity for the centre to regain some crucial lost ground in ensuring public faith in transparent and accountable governance. Will the centre wake up to the task of covering the ‘last miles’ problems of public administration in India?

In this regard, the centre should at least take some cues from state-level experiences and seize the huge opportunity by enacting the pending grievance redress bill that can provide an overarching legal and institutional framework to many vexing issues and exert much needed pressure on states living in the “waiting zone”.