The union government is reportedly contemplating changes to the provisions of suspension and transfers of members of all-India services created under Article 312 of the constitution so as to make prior consent of the union government mandatory. In the context of the recent controversy about the suspension of Durga Shakti Nagpal and half a dozen instances of harassment of well-meaning, young and idealistic officers of various all-India services to the detriment of public interest, even provoking concern from UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi, provide enough ground to make far reaching reforms in the management of all-India services to improve the grassroots level governance and accountability of state administrations. 

However, it is important to understand the constitutional and legal complexities involved. The all-India services follow the theory of strong central leadership for effective governance. Officers of all-India services are recruited for service under both the state and the central governments in various developmental, regulatory and policy making roles ranging from those of sub-divisional officers in the state revenue, police and forest to those of state chief secretaries, secretaries to the union government and even cabinet secretary. By virtue of Article 311 the all-India services officers enjoy two critical constitutional guarantees: (1) no dismissal or removal by anyone below the appointing authority, i.e., the union government, and (2) the right of an enquiry in which sufficient opportunity for hearing officers’ version on those charges prior to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 
 
The power to suspend or transfer an all-India services officer is however vested with the state governments during his or her tenure in the state cadre. The present debate centres on the potential for abuse of both powers of transfer as well as suspension. The problem is that both transfers and suspensions are prone to rampant abuse by local vested interests particularly against honest officers.  
 
Of the two powers prone to abuse, the power of transfer is the more lethal instrument used to remove an officer acting against the powerful vested interests. Unlike many state services, the all-India service officers in the state governments do not enjoy any standards of minimum tenure of service in any particular post. In states such as Kerala almost every other professional cadre enjoys a negotiated minimum tenure in a station. In the absence of transfer norms, it is seen that inconvenient upright officers are eased out too frequently promoting a culture of subjugation and tolerance of wrongdoing even scaling up to passively collaborating wrongdoing or corruption. 
 
As the all-India service officers are stationed in the states in strategically important senior positions and the stated purpose of the all-India services is to harmoniously standardise the quality of administration across the states and the centre, it logically follows that the officers posted against these significant positions need sufficient minimum tenure to contribute meaningfully. This principle has been upheld by the supreme court in the instance of strategically important positions in the centre such as cabinet secretary, secretaries of home and defence, and director of CBI. It would be pertinent to extend the principle of minimum tenure of all cadre positions filled from all-India service officers and removal by transfer before end of tenure must involve a quasi-judicial procedure administered by an appointments board in both centre and the state which is multi-member and hears the officer’s version before the proposal for premature transfer is finalised by the central or state government. Such a provision already exists in the service of the union government whereby the mechanisms of appointments committee of cabinet for officers of and above the rank of joint secretaries and the civil services board below that are involved to consider appointments and transfers on deputation in the union government.

There is a strong case to have a similar arrangement in the states whereby all cadre positions in the state are filled by suitable officers for a minimum tenure of two years and prior removal either upon request of the officer or the appointing ministry or upon grounds of indiscipline or lack of performance is heard and decided rather than acted through arbitrary transfers demoralising well-performing officers and others those who look up to them. A beneficial impact of reduction of arbitrary transfers and effecting transfers in a systematic manner after ascertaining the officer’s orientation through professional counselling involving reputed institutions like IIMs would result in better work satisfaction and reduce the persecution complex so common among the better performers. This will have a salutary impact in both emboldening the regulatory structure at the sub-divisional level and decrease the widespread corruption prevalent in the transfer of important field functionaries such as district magistrates, district superintendents of police and divisional forest officers. As movement of officers across postings become more predictable, the government will stand to spend much less on unproductive expenditure associated on premature transfer such as movement costs of the officers and would also improve their plan performance. 
 
According to studies by Dr N C Saxena, a former IAS officer and member of the national advisory council (NAC), that the implementation progress of important central sector schemes shows a high correlation with the increase in average tenure enjoyed by the respective district-level implementing officers primarily drawn from the all-India services.  As of now, the average tenure of district-level functionaries as well as cutting-edge-level project-level officers and heads of departments in the state government are as low as to six to nine months whereby lack of continuity and inadequate accountability are both rampant in the execution of these important schemes ranging from mid-day meals to waiver of agricultural loans, so frequently reflected in the CAG's audit reports.

In summary, there is a very strong case to rationalise the powers to transfer all-India service officers balancing the state government's inclination to remove an underperforming or corrupt officer with the fact that this power must be prone to minimum abuse and used sparingly so as to protect the primary purpose of having the All-India service officers in the states which is to ensure a continuity of quality administration in critical positions to ensure a uniform standard of administration across the states. 
 
Similarly, the powers of a state government to place an all-India service officer under suspension must be exercised only when the officer is charged with a criminal offence evidenced by a charge-sheet in a competent court or proceeded against for an offence involving moral turpitude, making continuance in the office compromise functioning or when his continuance is likely to obstruct or influence an ongoing criminal or disciplinary enquiry. In all such cases where a state government proposes to suspend an all-India service officer, a notice on the proposed grounds for suspension should be served on the officer and his representation considered by the state board of discipline and it may be explored whether a transfer to a different post would serve the purpose of the suspension.  
 
Only in those cases whereby the compromise or breach by the officer is severe and against the public interest should his suspension be effected. In other words, suspension on trivial and trumped-up charges may be made less possible by insisting on a quasi-judicial short enquiry. There is enough ground for the union government to issue executive instructions for mandatory compliance by the state governments to set up such an institutional mechanism and also amend the All-India Service Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1969 to incorporate such a procedure.
 
The case of Durga Sakthi Nagpal and various others buttress the need to implement this change which will no doubt increase the trust of public in public services, safeguard well-intentioned and hardworking officers against arbitrary penal action and also make appointments and removals far more transparent than they are at present. The onus is on Sonia Gandhi to walk the talk she has engaged in and also the judiciary to monitor the eradication of malice which she has correctly diagnosed. 

Opinion expressed here is personal.